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Abstract 
 
In the enterprise application software industry, dominant system vendors (hubs) 
have formed strategic partnerships with small software companies (spokes), 
resulting in the emergence of hub-and-spoke networks. Based upon the concept of 
software stacks, we argue that the governance mechanisms applied by hub and 
spokes depend on the complementarity between hub’s and spoke’s resources. 
Specifically, we draw on the relational view and combine it with the resource 
dependence theory to develop a theoretical framework that explains the link between 
the type of complementarity and differential governance mechanisms. We are able to 
show that while hubs seek to take advantage of complementarities with the entire 
network of partners, spokes are primarily interested in gaining access to 
complementary resources and capabilities of the hub organization. In order to 
leverage the benefits of resource complementarity, hubs mainly invest in network-
specific resources to generate value. On the contrary, the spokes’ investments are 
hub-specific. Accordingly, hubs only face minor threats of opportunistic behavior on 
the part of a specific spoke, whereas the spokes’ existence is endangered by the 
threat of opportunistic behavior by the hub. Due to these three asymmetries, hubs 
apply formal governance mechanisms in order to efficiently coordinate the network 
of spokes, whereas spokes rely on informal governance mechanisms. 
 
 
Keywords: Relational View, Resource Dependence Theory, Power 
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Introduction 
The structure of the enterprise application software (EAS) industry has been 
undergoing significant changes during the last decades. While early systems were 
custom-developed in a make-to-order fashion, in the 1970s, standardized, 
monolithic systems that covered the majority of the business processes of a 
variety of customers emerged and became the state-of-the-art during the 1980s. 
This turned the formerly diverse industry into an oligopolistic structure with a 
few dominating major system vendors (Campbell-Kelly, 2003). 
In recent years, however, this trend has been countervailed by a tendency towards 
disintegration (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999, Messerschmitt and Szyperski, 
2003). Facilitated by the emergence of standards and middleware technologies, 
like e.g. service-oriented architectures, the formerly integrated systems are more 
and more characterized by a high degree of modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 
1997). From a theoretical point of view, it can be argued that the tendency 
towards disintegrated systems should be mirrored by a higher degree of 
organizational modularity (Conway, 1968, Hoetker, 2006). However, in spite of 
the increasing interorganizational division of labor in the EAS industry, a 
seamless coordination between different organizations and friction-free mixing 
and matching of software components from different vendors is still a vision. 
Instead, partnership networks have emerged in which companies of the EAS 
industry agree to work together closely based on some mutually agreed standards 
(Gao and Iyer, 2008). Within these partnership networks, a limited number of 
large organizations, often referred to as hubs, platform leaders or keystones 
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(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, Iansiti and Levien, 2004, Jarillo, 1988), provide the 
systems’ architecture as well as generic core functionalities, while smaller 
software companies (referred to as spokes or niche players) build their solutions 
upon and complement these platforms (Iansiti and Levien, 2004, Prencipe, 2003). 
The compatibility and functionality of the spokes’ solutions is thereby often 
ensured through a certification of the spokes’ products or resources by the hub 
organization. The spokes represent independent legal entities that, unlike in 
supplier networks (e.g. in the automotive sector), sell their solutions directly to 
the market. Moreover, partner networks in the EAS industry are special in that 
although there is no direct exchange of tradable goods between the hub and the 
spokes, the networks compete with each other in a system competition that is 
characterized by network effects (Farrell et al., 1998, Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
We argue that this hub-and-spoke structure may often result in strong imbalance 
between partners, which in turn raises questions about the long term sustainability 
of such partnership arrangements. Hubs are generally perceived to be dominant 
over spokes due to their supremacy regarding assets, investments, market share, 
profits, as well as resource and revenue dependencies (Bala and Venkatesh, 
2007). 1 Bearing in mind this imbalance between hub and spokes, we argue that it 
is of special theoretical and practical interest to examine governance mechanisms 
applied in partnerships between dominant and non-dominant firms within partner 
networks in the EAS industry. For example, the question is raised how small 
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spoke organizations ensure that dominant hubs will not behave opportunistically, 
e.g. by substituting or imitating the small organizations’ products or by replacing 
the partner with another firm (i.e. partner). Power imbalance and the ensuing risk 
of opportunistic behavior call for appropriate governance mechanisms for 
alleviating partnership risks and for ensuring that the expected benefits of the 
partnership can be realized. 
In order to study differential forms and outcomes of partnerships, previous 
literature has drawn on the economic theory of complementarities (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1995). As such, it has been argued that the success of interorganizational 
arrangements in the software industry is dependent upon the respective position 
of the organizations within a software stack that reflects the architecture of the 
overall system (Gao and Iyer, 2006). Building on existing research, we apply the 
idea of complementarities between software firms to the special case of the EAS 
industry. Specifically, we shed more light on the theoretical reasons for value 
creation through inter-firm complementarity in the EAS industry. By studying the 
intermediate role of alternative governance mechanisms as a major prerequisite 
for achieving successful relationships (Lavie, 2007), we add to previous research 
that has mainly focused on the direct impact of inter-firm product 
complementarity on partnership success (Gao and Iyer, 2008). 
                                                                                                                                     
1 In the network structure observed in practice, hybrid forms exist. Some companies represent a 
spoke in one network, while taking the role of a hub in its own hub-and-spoke network. For 
instance, IBM and SAP are partners but have both established a network of spokes. In order to 
properly examine the impact of firm dominance, we focus on partnerships between dominant hubs 
and small spokes. 
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Taken together, this paper aims at theoretically answering the question of how the 
type of complementarity between the partners influences the choice of 
governance mechanisms applied by hub and spoke organizations within the EAS 
industry in order to leverage the benefits of complementary resource 
endowments. Our theoretical analysis builds on the relational view of competitive 
advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998) together with the resource-dependence theory 
(RDT, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Based on these two theoretical lenses a 
framework is developed that explains how the choice of different governance 
mechanisms by hub and spoke organizations in the EAS industry is influenced by 
three types of interrelated asymmetries between hub and spoke. The paper is 
structured as follows. First, the relational view is introduced. Subsequently, in 
order to develop our theoretical framework, the theoretical assertions of the 
relational view are analyzed in the light of relationships between hubs and spokes 
in the EAS industry. Finally, the framework is discussed and conclusions are 
drawn. 
A Relational View on Hub-and-Spoke Networks 
The Relational View of Inter-Organizational Competitive Advantage 
In drawing on the resource-based view of the firm (RBV, Barney, 1991, 
Wernerfelt, 1984) and on transaction cost economics (TCE, Williamson, 1981), 
the relational view of interorganizational competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 
1998) holds that firms can create relational rents when entering into partnerships 
with other firms that provide complementary resources. According to Dyer and 
Singh, complementary resources are “distinctive resources of alliance partners 
that collectively generate greater rents than the sum of those obtained from the 
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individual endowments of each partner” (Dyer and Singh, 1998, p. 666f). In order 
to leverage the potential benefits of complementary resources, firms have to 
invest in relation-specific assets (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Accordingly, the 
relationship itself can become the source of a competitive advantage if in fact it is 
unique (i.e. specific) and hence hard to imitate or substitute by competitors. This 
actually extends the key argument of the RBV, which has its primary focus on the 
internal resources of a firm (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).  
From a TCE perspective, however, increasing asset specificity leads to higher 
transaction costs, given that organizations that invest in relation-specific assets 
run the risk of opportunistic behavior on the part of their collaborators (Coase, 
1937, Williamson, 1981). While advocates of TCE perceive this as a trade-off 
and propose integration of transactions into the hierarchical organization as a 
remedy for transaction costs caused by high asset specificity, Dyer argues that 
transaction costs “do not necessarily increase with an increase in relation-specific 
investments” (1997, p. 551). Such a perspective emphasizes transaction value 
instead of transaction costs and holds that both inter-firm investments in relation-
specific assets and transaction cost discrimination are simultaneously feasible 
(Zajac and Olsen, 1993). More specifically, the central argument of the relational 
view is that interorganizational competitive advantage can be generated through 
inter-firm arrangements if the relationships move away from market transactions 
and, instead, invest in (1) inter-firm relation-specific assets as well as (2) inter-
firm knowledge-sharing routines, exploit (3) complementary resource 
endowments, and apply (4) effective governance mechanisms (Dyer and Singh, 
1998). Regarding the persistence of relational rents, Dyer and Singh’s (1998) 
relational view again draws on the RBV of the firm and argues that competitive 
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advantages by definition have to be difficult to imitate. Several of the 
mechanisms that help to sustain competitive advantages mentioned by Dyer and 
Singh can be subsumed under the term “uniqueness of the relationship”.2 
There are indications, however, that entering into unique relationships may not 
generally be the desired end for both parties of a relationship. For example, Lavie 
(2007) argues that alliances with dominant firms may promote the creation of 
value, but make it difficult for non-dominant firms to appropriate the created 
value. Moreover, the effect of power imbalance on value appropriation is found to 
increase with the level of bilateral competition between the firms (Lavie, 2007).3 
Lavie’s findings of the software industry hint upon the importance of governance 
mechanisms to create and appropriate value in situations of firm dominance. 
However, the impact of resource complementarities on governance mechanisms 
is not explicitly considered. 
This paper fills this gap and further analyzes the consequences of the imbalance 
between hub and spokes in the EAS industry on the alignment between 
complementarities and governance mechanisms from the perspective of the 
relational view. In order to do so, we discuss the sources of relational rents and 
the resulting rent preserving mechanisms in the light of partnerships between 
dominant and non-dominant organizations in the EAS industry. While Dyer and 
                                                 
2 Namely, causal ambiguities, time compression diseconomies, inter-organizational asset 
interconnectedness, and resource indivisibility prevent competitors from imitating the unique 
relationships of a focal dyad of companies (Barney, 1991, Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Additionally, 
Dyer and Singh mention the scarcity of potential partners and the institutional environment as 
factors that impede an imitation of inter-organizational competitive advantages. 
3 Such a situation of cooperation and competition is sometimes referred to as “co-opetiton” 
(Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1997). 
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Singh (1998) present the four sources of relational rents in an unconnected 
manner, we introduce a chain of reasoning that logically relates the different 
categories to each other, both from the spokes’ and the hubs’ perspective. In order 
to properly examine the alignment of resource complementarities and governance 
mechanisms, we first focus on inter-firm resource complementarities. 
Subsequently, investments in relation-specific assets and knowledge-creation that 
are necessary to benefit from resource complementarities and the resulting threat 
of opportunistic behavior will be analyzed. Finally, the consequences for 
governance mechanisms will be discussed.  
Generation of Relational Rents in Hub-and-Spoke Networks 
Resource Complementarity  
While previous research has focused on differences in the degree of 
complementarity between software firms (Gao and Iyer, 2008), we argue that 
within hub-and-spoke networks in the EAS industry, different types of 
complementarities exist. Moreover, complementarity may not only become 
important on a technological level, but also regarding the commercial and social 
capital of firms. These different types of complementarities are discussed below 
in order to subsequently study the consequences for the governance mechanisms 
applied by hub and spokes. 
Spoke Perspective. In order to better understand the notion of complementarity it 
is instructive to analyze the reasons for why firms enter into partnerships more 
closely. Several authors have transferred the idea of the RBV on 
interorganizational arrangements, stating that strategic assets may be accessed 
though inter-firm cooperation (Das and Teng, 2000, Eisenhardt and 
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Schoonhoven, 1996, Lavie, 2006). Thereby, especially those firms that suffer 
from a shortage of certain resources will try to form partnerships or alliances in 
order to overcome these resource gaps (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). 
However, in order to access resources through inter-firm collaboration, firms not 
only have to be willing to fill their own resource gaps, but also have to be 
attractive as a potential partner themselves, i.e., they have to possess certain 
resources which their potential collaborator lacks. This “duality of inducements 
and opportunities” (Ahuja, 2000) is particularly problematic for small and young 
companies. On the one hand, small and young companies often face what 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) call “strategic vulnerable positions” and are 
therefore prone to a lack of resources (Welsh and White, 1981). On the other 
hand, due to their limited size and often short period of existence, small and 
young companies will hardly be able to offer significant resources to potential 
partners, thus reducing the possibilities to overcome their own resource gaps 
through partnering (Ahuja, 2000, Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
The hub-and-spoke networks that emerged in the EAS industry seem to be a 
possible way-out of this dilemma. Through their partnerships with a hub, spokes 
can access external resources and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) that 
the hub disposes of. Ahuja (2000) proposes a taxonomy of strategic resources 
obtained through interorganizational cooperation that divide the resource 
endowments of potential partners into technological capital, commercial capital, 
and social capital. From a technological point of view, hubs provide the 
architecture that the spokes’ solutions are based upon. Innovating this architecture 
on a regular basis is deemed especially crucial in a dynamically changing 
environment like the EAS industry (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Regarding 
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commercial capital, hub companies that usually act on a global scale and have a 
large installed base of customers offer small spokes the possibility to access 
markets and marketing channels that would otherwise be unreachable. 
Furthermore, hubs dispose of social capital that spokes could benefit from in that 
they improve their own visibility and credibility by making use of the hub’s 
reputation and high profile and encourage hub personnel to recommend and 
promote the spoke’s solution.  
Hub Perspective. The hub organization, on the other hand, also benefits from the 
spokes’ strategic resources (Rothaermel, 2001). First and foremost, hubs can 
exploit the spokes’ commercial and social capital to address niche markets they 
have so far not been able or willing to approach. Regarding technological capital, 
spokes are assumed to dispose of specific knowledge in these niches and be 
especially successful in innovating specific modules of the overall system 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). However, and central to our reasoning, we argue 
that due to the spokes’ mentioned resource limitations, the hub does not gain 
competitive advantages from a singular relationship with one specific spoke. 
Instead, we opine that the hub benefits from the multilateral 1:n-relationship with 
the network as a whole. 
This becomes clear when considering that the main reasons for the emergence of 
hub-and-spoke networks may be seen in the fact that competition and demand 
heterogeneity have forced large vendors to give up proprietary approaches in 
order to gain market share and strive for becoming a de facto standard (Schilling 
and Steensma, 2001, Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Put differently, hubs face a 
system competition with rival networks that is characterized by network effects 
(Farrell et al., 1998, Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Therefore, we argue that hubs 
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prosper in particular if a great number of spokes participates in their network and 
offers complementary functionalities, a fact that is even reinforced since spoke 
companies will often not be able to offer solutions for different competing 
platforms due to resource limitations. 
 
 
 
 
To sum up, within the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, spoke 
companies aim at accessing the hub’s resources, while the hub benefits from the 
resources provided by the network as a whole. This distinction in value-
generating relationships is depicted in Figure 1. While hubs gain value from the 
network and thus, figuratively, form a multilateral relationship with the network 
as a whole (left), spokes enter into bilateral 1:1-relationships with the hub (right). 
This is summarized by the following asymmetry. 
Asymmetry 1: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, the 
combination of complementary resource endowments in a singular hub-spoke 
relationship only provides significant value to the spoke. Hubs benefit from 
complementarities with the network as a whole. 
Investments in Relation-Specific Assets 
The concept of complementary resource endowments of partnering firms suggests 
a potential value gain through combining resources. However, in order to realize 
these benefits, firms have to invest in relation-specific assets (Dyer and Singh, 
1 : n 
Multilateral 
Hub Network Spoke Hub 
1 : 1 
Bilateral 
Figure 1: Hub-Network Relationship vs. Spoke-Hub Relationship 
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1998). Generally, asset specificity has been defined as the “the degree to which 
an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without 
sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson, 1990, p. 142). Translated to the case 
of interorganizational relationships, asset specificity refers to the degree to which 
assets are of low usefulness in other relationships. If hub-and-spoke networks are 
understood as a system that collectively produces EAS through inter-firm division 
of labor, investing in relation-specific assets can be interpreted as an 
“optimization of the components [of the system] working in a particular 
configuration”, resulting in combinations that “achieve a functionality 
unobtainable though combinations of more independent components” (Schilling, 
2000, p. 315f). Stated in other words, the complementarity of the partners’ 
resource endowments results in a high degree of synergistic specificity, i.e., “[t]he 
degree to which a system achieves greater functionality by its components being 
specific to one another” (Schilling, 2000, p. 316). 
Regarding the assets that are generally deemed necessary in order to develop and 
market software products, the individuals that are involved in the production and 
marketing process were found to be of utmost importance, rendering software 
production a people business (Boehm, 1987, De Marco and Lister, 1987). More 
specifically and in line with the above discussion on resource complementarities, 
the knowledge of the involved individuals plays a pivotal role in producing and 
marketing software (Robillard, 1999). This is reinforced in the EAS industry, 
where knowledge about both software development and business processes is 
needed. Thus, in the here analyzed context, relation-specific investments mainly 
refer to investments in relation-specific knowledge creation.  
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Spoke Perspective. We argue that the spokes indeed have to invest heavily in 
assets that are specific to the hub in order to participate in the hub’s partner 
network and enable the access to complementary resources and capabilities as 
discussed in the previous paragraph. First and foremost, spokes have to invest in 
hub-specific knowledge accumulation in order to enable the partnership through 
having their solutions and resources certified by the hub. In order to get this 
certification, spokes have to obtain knowledge about the functioning of the hub’s 
platform and interfaces in order to develop solutions that are compatible with all 
other solutions that build upon the same platform. Moreover, developers may 
have to prove their knowledge about the hub’s technology by attending trainings 
and passing tests. Once the spokes have accomplished the certification, 
continuous investments in hub-specific technological and market-related 
knowledge accumulation have to be made in order to keep up with recent 
developments in the dynamically changing EAS industry. Thereby, it is important 
to consider the difference between information and know-how (Dyer and Singh, 
1998). While information can be codified and stored in data bases, know-how 
involves knowledge that is sticky or tacit (Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001). In order to 
gain access to external sticky knowledge, spokes may have to put effort and 
invest into the creation of absorptive capacity, i.e., “the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p. 128). Moreover, in order to 
generate relational rents and not to be imitable by other partnerships, this ability 
has to be partner-specific, i.e., in the case of a singular relationship between hub 
and spoke, specific to a dyad of organizations (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Partnering 
with a hub may provide the spoke with access to certain data bases with 
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information on technological issues. In order to gain a competitive advantage 
through leveraging complementary resource endowments, however, spokes may 
need to access know-how within the hub that is not amenable to codification, e.g. 
because it resides within the experience and long-time collaboration of certain 
individuals. Thus, further hub-specific investments into absorptive capacity and 
knowledge-sharing may be necessary. 
Hub Perspective. While spokes invest in hub-specific knowledge creation and 
integration in order to gain relational rents from their partnership with the hub, 
the situation turns out to be different on the hub side. As mentioned above, hubs 
certify the compatibility and quality of the spokes’ solution before entering a 
partnership with a spoke. Thus, hubs as well have to engage in spoke-specific 
investments to some extent. However, as the preceding section on resource 
complementarities showed, hubs benefit from the network of spokes as a whole 
and thus, figuratively, form a relationship with the network (reconsider figure 1). 
As argued above, due to the hub’s striving for becoming a de facto standard, this 
network is especially valuable for the hub if a great number of spokes 
participates. Therefore, we argue that hubs aim at relational extendability, i.e., the 
“ability to reconfigure existing competencies for new [interorganizational 
relationships]” (Bala and Venkatesh, 2007, p. 343). For instance, while spokes 
strive for getting access to sticky know-how through developing hub-specific 
absorptive capacity, we argue that hubs, instead of engaging in knowledge-
sharing routines with particular spokes, may rely on codifying information 
regarding technological and market-related issues in order to efficiently distribute 
it throughout the network (Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001). According to Bala and 
Venkatesh, relational extendability may result in relational rents by leading to 
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cost effectiveness, high partner density, partnering flexibility, partnering agility, 
greater structural embeddedness, greater control over partners, and less resource 
dependency on partners. Thus, in order to generate relational rents from their 
multilateral 1:n relationship with the network of spokes, we argue that hubs will 
be reluctant to invest heavily in assets that are specific to a singular relationship 
with a particular spoke. Instead, hubs may mainly invest in network-specific 
assets in order to efficiently leverage the complementarities in their multilateral 
relationship with the network as a whole. Summarizing this paragraph on 
relation-specific asset investments, we find the following asymmetry: 
Asymmetry 2: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, only spokes 
invest in relation-specific assets, while the hubs’ investments are mainly network-
specific. 
Opportunistic Behavior  
As outlined above, interorganizational arrangements can be perceived as a trade-
off between the relational rents generated through combining complementary 
resources as well as investing in relation-specific assets on the one hand, and the 
transaction costs resulting from the threat of opportunistic behavior on the other 
hand (Dyer, 1997, Williamson, 1981). We argue that in the hub-and-spoke 
networks of the EAS industry, both hubs and spokes are prone to behave 
opportunistically to a certain extent.  
Spoke Perspective. Since spokes, as discussed above, invest heavily in their 
relationship with a hub, they cannot easily switch to other platform vendors 
without loosing the majority of their up-front, hub-specific investments and being 
forced to re-invest into the new platform. This lock-in, however, ceteris paribus 
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increases the hub’s propensity to behave opportunistically, i.e., to exploit the 
spokes’ lock-in situation and take advantage of opportunities at the spokes’ 
expense (Williamson, 1975). Thus, the more spokes invest in assets that are 
specific to their relationship with the hub, the more these spokes are at the hub’s 
mercy not to behave opportunistically. Based on Lavie’s (2006) extension of the 
RBV to interorganizational arrangements, we argue that hub organizations may 
behave opportunistically in two important ways. First, hubs may be reluctant to 
share resources with a specific spoke and thus decrease the possibilities of value 
creation. Second, hubs may behave opportunistically and appropriate what Lavie 
calls “outbound spillover rent” (2006), i.e., the hub may capitalize on its 
dominant position by absorbing the spokes’ critical knowledge. Both threats of 
opportunistic behavior will be analyzed subsequently. 
As discussed above, spoke companies benefit from the characteristics of system 
competition in hub-and-spoke networks, since this system competition implies the 
opportunity to access external resources residing inside the hub organization that 
the spokes are highly dependent upon for successfully developing and marketing 
their EAS. On the contrary, hubs were found to be mainly dependent on the 
network as a whole and not on the resources of a single spoke. The RDT as 
proposed by (Dyer and Singh, 1998) deals with such interorganizational 
dependencies. Central to this theory is the power distribution between 
organizational actors that results from dependencies on external resources that are 
beyond an organization’s control. Power is perceived as the counterpart of 
dependence, since “the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the 
dependence of B upon A” (Emerson, 1962, p. 33). In line with the above 
discussion on resource complementarities, we argue that in the hub-and-spoke 
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networks of the EAS industry, spoke organizations face a situation of 
considerable power imbalance.  
From a RDT perspective, through participating in the partner network of a hub 
organization, spokes attempt to absorb the constraints posed by the limited access 
to required external resource. In a situation of power imbalance, however, 
constraint absorption is unlikely, since the dominant organization prefers 
maintaining the status quo of power distribution since otherwise it would lose “its 
bargaining power and the advantageous exchange conditions that accompany it” 
(Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005, p. 172). Accordingly, we argue that hubs, although 
fostering a partner network of spokes, are reluctant to grant unlimited access to 
complementary resources to singular spoke organizations. For example, although 
accessing the hub’s global marketing channel could be considered highly 
beneficial for the spokes, the hub is not expected to grant this access in an 
unlimited way. 
Second, the power imbalance in the hub-spoke relationship together with the high 
degree of investments in relation-specific assets performed by the spoke may lead 
to knowledge spillovers. The hub may behave opportunistically and capitalize on 
its dominant position over the spokes by absorbing the spokes’ critical knowledge 
that is unveiled throughout the partnership and apply it to commercial ends itself. 
For instance, the hub may appropriate these “outbound spillover rent” (Lavie, 
2006) by imitating a spoke’s functionality after getting access to the spoke’s 
solutions’ source code throughout the certification process. The reason for this 
may be that the hub changes its product strategy and considers functionalities that 
were formerly out of its scope as a part of its core competencies. For a spoke 
organization, the imitation of its functionality can be considered a very harmful 
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act of opportunistic behavior, since it may dramatically jeopardize the spoke’s 
survival. 
Hub Perspective. From the perspective of hub organizations, spokes may follow 
their self-interest and, for instance, offer functionalities to their customers that are 
also covered by the hub’s solution, thus ending up in a situation of competition, 
which may be assumed not to be in the hub’s interest. Moreover, spokes may not 
comply with certain interface standards posed by the hub, thus decreasing the 
overall compatibility of the systems. However, according to TCE, opportunistic 
behavior in interorganizational partnerships is especially likely if the involved 
actors invest in partner-specific assets. The more an actor invests in assets that are 
specific to a certain partner, the more this actor is locked into the relationship, 
since ending the relationship would imply the loss of the partner-specific 
investment performed ex ante (Williamson, 1975). As we have shown above, 
hubs generally avoid investing heavily in assets that are specific to a single spoke. 
Therefore, we argue that hubs only face minor threats of opportunistic behavior in 
a singular relationship with a spoke. 
Taken together, we find that due to their dominant position and their reluctance to 
invest in spoke-specific assets, hubs only face minor threats of opportunistic 
behavior. On the contrary, the spoke organizations have to deal with the hub’s 
potential reluctance to share resources. Furthermore, the hub may capitalize on 
knowledge spillovers and imitate the spokes’ solutions, posing another class of 
opportunistic behavior. To sum up, we find 
Asymmetry 3: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, hubs only face 
minor threats of opportunistic behavior on the part of the spokes, while the 
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spokes’ business model is threatened by the hubs’ reluctance to share resources 
and the potential exploitation of knowledge spillovers. 
Governance Mechanisms  
Out of the four factors that enable the generation of value through 
interorganizational relationships proposed by Dyer and Singh (1998), the 
application of effective governance mechanisms plays a special role because its 
impact on value generation is twofold. First, from a TCE perspective, effective 
governance mechanisms may lower transaction costs and thus directly increase 
relational rents. Second, effective governance mechanism may foster the 
generation of relational rents by increasing the willingness of partners to engage 
in value creation initiatives, i.e., to combine complementary resources and to 
invest in relation-specific assets and knowledge-sharing mechanisms. Generally, 
two types of governance mechanisms may be distinguished. Formal governance 
mechanisms refer to instruments that are codified by contracts, technological 
standards or through other formal devices that enable the partners to exercise 
control (like e.g. the discussed certification process). On the contrary, we 
understand informal governance mechanisms as implicit coordination measures 
that reduce the threat of opportunistic behavior like e.g. mutual adjustment based 
on socialization and trust (Adler, 1995, Kraut and Streeter, 1995). 
Spoke Perspective. The above discussion on opportunistic behavior showed that 
the spokes have to deal with a considerable threat of opportunistic behavior on 
the part of the hub organization. This threat of opportunism consists in the hub’s 
reluctance to share resources as well as in the threat of knowledge spillover. Dyer 
(1997) suggests that in the face of relation-specific investments, informal 
governance mechanism are better suited for impeding opportunistic behavior of a 
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partner than formal governance mechanisms. In a similar way, considering the 
power imbalance between hub and spoke, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) propose 
that dependent organizations engage in unilateral measures to deal with the 
limited access to resources resulting from power imbalance. The dependent 
organization is assumed to apply tactics to “restructure dependencies by aiming 
directly at the constraining party in the relationship” (Casciaro and Piskorski, 
2005, p. 167). For instance, dependent actors may attempt to stabilize “the flow 
of valued resources by socializing members of the constraining organization or 
through the exchange of other valuable goods, such as status, friendship, or 
information” (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005, p. 168). Following this point of view, 
we argue that while hubs behave opportunistically on a strategic and 
organizational level, the governance mechanisms that act as a remedy against the 
threat of this opportunistic behavior can mainly be found on an individual level. 
For instance, we have shown that, despite the spokes’ investments in hub-specific 
absorptive capacity, hubs may be unwilling to grant unlimited access to their 
commercial, technological, and social capital. Thus, in order to actually exploit 
the access to external resources, spokes may rely on informal governance 
mechanisms. This assertion is substantiated by the findings of Yli-Renko et al. 
(2001), who argue that external knowledge acquisition from key customers that is 
found to increase firm success is positively influenced by social interaction, the 
quality of the relationship, and the network ties provided by this customers. We 
argue that Yli-Renko et al.’s results may be transferred to hub-spoke relationships 
in the EAS industry, holding that through informal governance mechanisms like 
social interaction, spokes may exploit the access to complementary resources 
21 
                                 
residing within the hub organization in spite of the hub’s discussed unwillingness 
to share resources with a specific spoke.  
Furthermore, informal relationships with decision makers within the hub 
organization that are based on trust may prevent the hub from exploiting the 
spoke’s know-how that is unveiled through the partnership and thus avoid an 
imitation of the spoke’s business model, even though it might be strategically 
appropriate from the hub organization’s point of view. 
However, strategic re-orientation and pressure from a greater number of 
customers to offer a certain functionality (turning the market for this functionality 
from a niche into a large segment) may imply the necessity for the responsible 
individuals within the hub organization to eventually imitate the spoke’s solutions 
in spite of the spoke’s informal relationships with hub staff. In such a situation, 
informal governance mechanisms may encourage the hub to share knowledge 
with a specific spoke that is valuable for its long-term success. For instance, hub 
personnel may “warn” the spoke in advance and thereby provide the spoke with 
more time to bring in its capability to innovate and to come up with new solutions 
and functionalities. Moreover, hub staff may actively provide the spoke with hints 
which market segments are promising and will not be addressed by the hub in the 
future (Uzzi, 1997, p. 45). Thus, informal governance mechanisms can be seen as 
a possibility for spokes both to actually exploit the gained access to external 
resources and to ensure future success.  
Hub Perspective. In contrast to the relational governance mechanisms aimed at by 
the spokes, hubs may more strongly rely on formal governance mechanisms. The 
discussion on opportunistic behavior in the previous section showed that hubs 
only face minor threats of opportunism due to the low amount of spoke-specific 
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investments and the spokes’ dependence on the external resources owned by the 
hub. Furthermore, as the discussion on relation-specific asset investments pointed 
out, hubs aim at efficiently coordinating the potentially great number of spoke 
organization. Therefore, we expect hubs to mostly rely on formal governance 
through contracts, technological standards, and the mentioned certification 
process in order to efficiently prevent the potentially great number of spokes from 
behaving opportunistically.  
Taken together, this discussion suggests that the formal governance mechanisms 
applied by the hub in order to efficiently coordinate the network of spokes may 
not be sufficient for spokes in order to create relational rents and to access sticky 
knowledge that resides inside the hub organization. Instead, informal governance 
mechanisms like social interaction and trust may be necessary to gain competitive 
advantages through the interorganizational relationship with the hub and to 
develop hub-specific absorptive capacity. Summarizing the discussion on 
appropriate governance mechanisms, we find the following proposition. 
Proposition: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, hubs rely on 
formal governance mechanism and standards to coordinate the network and to 
gain relational rents from the hub-network relationship. In contrast, in order to 
ensure long-term relational rents, spokes rely on informal governance 
mechanisms and the development of hub-specific absorptive capacity.  
Summary 
We argue that within the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, hubs and 
spokes pursue substantially different agendas. More specifically, we find three 
inter-related types of asymmetries that together explain the differential 
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governance mechanisms applied by hubs and spokes. First, hubs benefit from 
complementarities with the network of spokes, whereas spokes create value 
through accessing external resources that reside within the hub organization. 
Second, in order to benefit from their respective value-generating relationship 
(bilateral vs. multilateral), spokes invest in hub-specific assets, whereas the hubs’ 
investments are mainly network-specific. Third, this has significant consequences 
for the threat of opportunistic behavior hub and spoke are exposed to 
respectively. While hubs face only minor threats of opportunistic behavior, the 
spokes’ business model may be jeopardized if the hub is reluctant to share 
resources or capitalizes on knowledge spillovers. This, in turn, has consequences 
for the governance mechanisms hub and spoke apply. While hubs mainly rely on 
formal governance mechanisms, spokes seek to apply informal governance 
mechanisms to prevent the hub from behaving opportunistically and to gain 
access to sticky knowledge within the hub organization, thus exploiting the access 
to external, complementary resources and ensuring future success. Taken 
together, we argue that while hubs strive for a standardization of the partnerships 
with small software companies, spokes aim at relational governance and an 
increased uniqueness of their relationship with the hub. Figure 2 summarizes our 
framework. 
Discussion 
Our preceding analysis has shown that the notion of complementarity and its 
wider implications on partnership governance need to be re-evaluated in a new 
light when partnerships in hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry are 
examined. The differential roles that hub and spoke organizations play in such a 
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network as well as the power imbalance that exists between the partners result in 
a chain of asymmetries. This chain of asymmetries in turn results in different 
types of governance mechanisms that are preferred by both parties, yet need to be 
aligned in order to achieve mutual benefits from the partnership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our theoretical analysis shows that spokes strive for 1:1-complementarity with 
the hub, while the hub strives for 1:n-complementary with all of its spokes. 
Therefore, in line with the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998), the spokes 
seek to tighten their relationship with the hub through relation-specific 
investments. These investments are the basis for achieving a comparative 
advantage over their competitors. By contrast, the hub seeks to invest into 
network resources that enable economies of scale and scope in network 
management, i.e., hubs strive for relational extendabilty. Accordingly, the 
Type of Relational 
Complementarity 
Type of Relational 
Investment 
Relative Threat of 
Opportunistic 
Behavior by Partner
Type of 
Governance 
Mechanism
Overall Relational 
Objective 
Multilateral 
(Network)
Network-specific 
LOW 
Formal 
Standardization 
Bilateral     
(Hub-Spoke) 
Hub-specific 
HIGH 
Informal 
Uniqueness 
Figure 2: Theoretical Framework 
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consequences of opportunistic behavior are more severe for spokes than for the 
hubs. Paradoxically, the only way for the spokes to avoid opportunistic behavior 
of the hub is to invest even more in relation-specific assets, e.g. through building 
up social relationships and mutual trust with hub personnel. Thus, the spoke 
would favor informal governance. By contrast, the hub would seek to increase its 
network investments and thus foster formal governance, e.g. through establishing 
formal procedures on how the spokes’ solutions can be certified. Hence, contrary 
to the findings of Bala and Venkatesh (1998) who argue that an increased 
relational extendability generally results in relational rents for the partnering 
organizations, we showed that in the context of this study, relational extendability 
creates relational rents only for the hub organization in its relationship with the 
network as a whole. Spokes, in contrast, aim at increasing the uniqueness of their 
relationship with the hub, i.e. the relational specificity (Bala and Venkatesh, 
2007). Thereby, spokes may thwart the hub’s plan to create value from their 
multilateral relationship with the network of spokes through efficiently 
coordinating the dyadic relationships.  
Managerial Implications. By incorporating this tension into our research model, 
our study has several important managerial implications for organizations in the 
EAS industry. Hub organizations may learn from our findings and dispense with 
a mainly efficiency-driven view. In order to be successful in the system 
competition with other networks in the long run, hubs have to find a reasonable 
balance between efficiently coordinating the network and satisfying the singular 
spokes. As we have shown, the spokes strive for relational specificity on an 
individual level, engaging in personal ties with hub staff. This implies that for the 
hub organization, it may be more reasonable to systematically install a certain 
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degree of relational governance that complements the formal governance through 
standards and certification (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), instead of letting the 
coordination through personal ties blossom in an uncontrollable way. As a lesson 
learned from our study, the ideal goal of hub organizations should be to enable a 
“mass customization” of the governance in their partner networks, i.e., to 
efficiently satisfy the spokes’ desire for relational governance. Improved 
technological solutions for collaboration like, e.g., web 2.0 technologies, may be 
a possible way towards such a “mass customization”.  
Spokes, on the other hand, were found to aim at informally governing their 
relationship with the hub. We argue that informal ties on a personal level may 
indeed be beneficial for spokes to get access to external technological, 
commercial, and social capital. However, spokes may face the problem that 
sociologists refer to as overembeddedness (Uzzi, 1997), i.e., by, at least in the 
short run, successfully relying on strong personal ties, spokes may miss to 
develop their own technological, commercial, and social capital. If the personal 
network ceases to exist, e.g. due to job fluctuation, spokes may eventually be 
penalized. Generally, the scenario that the spokes face resembles a classical 
prisoners’ dilemma. If one spoke leverages personal ties and thereby undercuts 
the standard coordination mechanisms, it may be beneficial for this spoke. If all 
spokes do so, however, the whole network and thus its participators may 
eventually lose ground in the system competition with other networks that 
coordinate the relationships more efficiently.  
Theoretical Implications. Apart from these practical implications, our study 
makes important theoretical contributions. First, we complement existing work on 
the link between complementarities in the software stack and the success of 
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interorganizational arrangements. Instead of analyzing the influence of 
complementarity on success on a high level, we focused on the alignment of the 
governance mechanisms with the type of complementarity. Regarding the 
differential types of complementarity, we added to previous studies by 
considering not only technological resources, but also the partners’ endowments 
with commercial and social capital. Moreover, we differentiate the 
complementarities of the hub with the network as a whole as well as with a 
specific spoke. As such, we find that the type of complementarity – bilateral (1:1) 
versus multilateral (1:n) – heavily influences the applied governance mechanisms. 
Second, we apply the relational view as proposed by Dyer and Singh (1998) to 
the scenario of firm imbalance in hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry. 
The relational view holds that both partners to an exchange have to invest in 
relation-specific assets in order to leverage complementary resource-endowments. 
On the contrary, the emergence of partner networks in the EAS industry where 
only spokes invest in assets that are specific to the relationship with the hub 
shows that this does not necessarily have to be the case.  
As a direct consequence of the differences between hub and spoke regarding 
relation-specific asset investments, spokes apply informal governance 
mechanisms with the goal of value creation in their relationship with the hub, 
while the hub strives for generating value through the network as a whole. Due to 
these differing value propositions in hub-and-spoke networks, the role of value 
appropriation, as highlighted by Lavie (2007), is of less importance. Other than in 
more closely tight strategic alliances, where partners work together to achieve a 
common outcome, the value of hub and spoke results from leveraging resources 
and products of each other. 
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Limitations and Future Research. One of the main limitations of our theoretical 
framework is its static nature, which takes power imbalance between dominant 
hubs and small spokes as a matter of fact. This view neglects that the power 
distribution between hub and spoke may change over time and eventually turn 
into a situation of mutual dependence (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Ahuja 
(2000) mentions radical innovations that mark discontinuities in the technical 
progress as an opportunity for new entrants to develop significant resources. In a 
similar way, the spoke may achieve a situation of mutual dependence through 
developing special commercial or social capital, e.g., if a former unimportant 
customer base turns into a key segment. Such an increase in technological, 
commercial, or social capital that is complementary to the hub’s resources may 
turn the bilateral partnership between a hub and a spoke into a source of value for 
the hub. If the synergistic specificity of hub’s and spoke’s resources is high, the 
hub may decide to merge with or acquire the spoke organization in order to 
internalize the benefits that result from this synergistic specificity and absorb the 
constraints posed by the emerging power of the spoke4. Although the small size 
of spoke organizations and their oftentimes relatively short period of existence 
may render it difficult for the majority of spokes to develop resources the hub 
organization is indeed dependent upon (Wernerfelt, 1984), considering the 
possibility that spokes may become more powerful over time could be a 
promising theme for future research. Specifically, future research could take a 
                                                 
4 Such a situation of merging with or being acquired by the hub may actually be in the interest of 
many spokes. 
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dynamic process view and analyze the lifecycle of partnerships between hubs and 
spokes (Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
As discussed above, the asymmetry in relationship specific investments between 
hub and spoke translates into opposing governance mechanisms which may 
threaten the stability of the partnership in the long run. This discrepancy calls for 
future research on mediating governance modes that help balancing out the 
preferences for informal (spoke) versus formal (hub) governance. To this end, it 
may be interesting to examine the role of ICT tools for collaboration as a 
mediating mechanism. Such a collaboration platform would allow the hub to 
address the needs of multiple spokes simultaneously, while still accounting for 
the requirements of particular spokes through 1:1 collaboration. The concept of 
communities of practice (CoP) may be transferred to this scenario, where multiple 
CoPs would possibly coexist in the hub-and-spoke network (Gongla and Rizzuto, 
2001). 
Furthermore, future research may draw on our theoretical insights in further 
analyzing and empirically validating both the existence of the proposed 
asymmetries between hubs and spokes as well as the causal relationship between 
resource complementarities, relation-specific asset investments, the threat of 
opportunistic behavior, and appropriate governance mechanisms. In order to 
obtain a more powerful explanatory model, the causal links suggested in figure 1 
may be enriched by considering the consequences and interrelations of the 
complementarity of the technological, commercial, and social capital on 
governance mechanisms in more detail. As another promising theme for future 
work, we call for an in-depth analysis of the informal governance mechanisms 
applied by the spokes. While our study addressed informal governance 
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mechanisms in a general way and mentioned e.g. socialization and trust, future 
research may examine in more detail which, when, and how informal governance 
mechanisms are actually applied. Moreover, it may be fruitful to include the 
success of the dyadic partnerships between hubs and spokes from the hubs’, the 
spokes’, the dyadic, and the network perspective into a comprehensive research 
model. Such an enhanced research model would explain the impact of 
complementarities on partnership success. However, we argue that the 
incorporation of governance mechanisms as a mediator of this link may result in a 
research model with increased explanatory power. 
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